I. Introduction

1. KontraS is a national human rights non-governmental organization based in Jakarta, Indonesia. Its main activities are geared towards support for the victims of human rights violations. It seeks to improve respect and protection for human rights within Indonesia through advocacy, investigations, campaigns, and lobbying activities. KontraS monitors several issues such as enforced disappearances, torture, impunity, and violations of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.

2. SAFEnet is a regional digital rights organization based in Denpasar, Indonesia. SAFEnet was founded with a vision of realization of a digital space that upholds human rights values for all people and mission to defend digital rights in the Southeast Asia region, including their rights to access the internet, rights to express freely, and rights to feel safe in digital spaces. SAFEnet has been actively advocating for victims of the digital right violations, especially critical groups who use the Internet as a tool for expression and opinion.

II. Overview

3. In the third cycle of UPR in 2017, the Indonesian government accepted the recommendations regarding the situation of Rights to Dissent:
   a. Improve training and administrative instructions for police and local authorities to ensure that the right to peaceful assembly is universally respected, including in the provinces of Papua and West Papua;
b. Ensure human rights obligations in Papua are upheld, respected and promoted, including freedom of assembly, freedom of the press and the rights of women and minorities; ii

c. Repeal or amend articles 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code to avoid restrictions on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; iii

d. End prosecutions under articles 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code for exercising freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; iv

e. Ensure that existing legal and constitutional provisions protecting human rights in particular freedom of expression, association and assembly are fully implemented nationwide; v

f. Intensify all efforts to respect and uphold freedom of expression, assembly, and religion and belief, and to prevent discrimination on any grounds including sexual orientation and gender identity; vi

4. Tracing back to the previous UPR cycle up until this date, Indonesia has yet fully implemented a secure and safe training as well as administrative instructions for the police officers and local authorities since security officers still use force either bare hands or weapons to ‘secure’ citizens who are trying to take protests. This is done to ‘protect’ or ‘secure’ several local areas from turmoil.

5. According to KontraS’s documentation, Papua has also yet received such respect and promotion of human rights. In fact, conditions to dissent in the area are deteriorating. This can be seen through the militarism by being sent out militaries which dominated security in Papua. This militarism seems to pervade in Papua as citizens there are scared to utter their own dissent.

6. Article 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code that have been mentioned several times in the recommendations have also yet been implemented since there are a couple of times when Papua Citizens were threatened and silenced. Examples can be seen through the death of Father Yeremia in Papua who was shot dead due to him being vocal in voicing out his thoughts. This pattern of silencing vocal people in Papua seems to be impaled deeply in the area. Times when Papua’s internet connection got cut off was also an iconic moment where the Indonesian Government was trying to ‘keep Papuan Citizens safe from hoax’.

7. The series of acts also conclude that freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly has yet been fully implemented in Indonesia, particularly Papua as a main study case. Although Indonesia has implemented several articles related to the cases such as Article No. 9 of 1998 as well as Article No. 19 of 2016 regarding freedom of expression in general and through online, the cases have yet represented Indonesia to fully execute the designated law.
**Regulation on Freedom of Expression and Potential Threats in the RKUHP (draft Criminal Code bill) and other regulations**

8. We have mapped a number of regulations in Indonesia that are used systematically to limit the Freedom of Expression: defamation articles (article 310 and 311 of the Criminal Code (KUHP), article 27 (paragraph 3) in conjunction with article 45 (paragraph 3) ITE Law), hate speech articles (156 and Article 157(1) of the Criminal Code, Article 6 of Law No. 9 of 1998 concerning Freedom to Express Opinions in Public and Article 28(2) of the ITE Law), blasphemy articles (Article 156a of the Criminal Code), fake news article (Article 14 and Article 15 of Law Number 1 of 1946, article 390 of the Criminal Code, Article 28 paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 45 paragraph 1 of the ITE Law), treason articles (Article 106 of the Criminal Code and article 110 of the Criminal Code), Cut Internet Access article (Article 40 paragraph 2b of ITE Law), contempt of court article (Article 281 in the new Criminal Code Bill)

**Defamation articles**

9. Indonesia inherits defamation legal framework from the Dutch Criminal Code or Wetboek van Strafrecht (“WvS”), which was ratified under Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlandsch Indie or Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (“KUHP”). This legislation entered into force on 1 January 1918, by the issuance of Koninklijk Besluit (King’s Decree ) No. 33 dated 15 October 1915. KUHP stipulates defamation articles in various provisions and chapters. The defamation articles regulate defamation towards a person to defamation against a deceased person. KUHP also acknowledges other provisions using defamation as an offense, such as defamation towards a public institution. Additionally, KUHP also incorporated defamation against the President and Vice President, which was already revoked by the Constitutional Court under Decision No. 013-022/PUU-IV/2006.

10. The Indonesian government retains most of the defamation articles in the Criminal Code even though Indonesia has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which stipulates freedom of expression and explicitly states such right under the 1945 Constitution that was enacted on 18 August 1945. After the demise of the New Order 1998, constitutional guarantee on freedom of speech was later affirmed under Article 28E (3) and Article 28F, which states: “Every person shall have the right to communicate and to obtain information for the purpose of the development of his/her self and social environment, and shall have the right to seek, obtain, possess, store, process and convey information by utilizing all available types of channels.”

11. In the new Criminal Code Bill, some defamation articles appeared: the criminal article on insulting the president and vice president; Article on the crime of insulting the legitimate government; and Articles of criminal defamation of state institutions. Actually, a number of
defamation articles were previously annulled by the Constitutional Court in 2006 through the Constitutional Court's Decision Number 013-022/PUU-IV/2006, especially the criminal article for insulting the President and Vice President in the Criminal Code.

12. Not only defending defamation articles in the new Criminal Code, the Indonesian government has also expanded the defamation provisions in the Information and Electronic Transactions Law (ITE Law) in 2008. Defamation on this law is regulated in article 27 (paragraph 3) in conjunction with article 45 (paragraph 3), with a criminal penalty of 6 years in prison and a fine of 1 billion rupiahs. In the 2016 amendment to the Law, its criminal penalty was later changed to 4 years in prison and a fine/penalty 750 million rupiahs. This provision expanded the scope of defamation in the online sphere to include electronic information published unintentionally or by third parties, covering all acts distributing and/or transmitting and/or making accessible defamatory electronic information.

13. The defamation regulation in the ITE Law is a serious obstacle to freedom of expression in the online space. Article 27 paragraph 3 in conjunction with Article 45 paragraph 3 in the ITE Law, is a duplication of articles 310, 311, 315, 317, 318, 319 in the Criminal Code. This provision removes the gradation of insults (slander, libel, laster, etc.). In the Criminal Code, the term 'insult' is the title of a separate chapter where the form of action consists of six forms of criminal acts, namely blasphemy, blasphemy by letter, slander, minor insults, false complaints or slanderous complaints, and slanderous acts. Meanwhile, in the ITE Law, there is no categorization of offenses against insults.

14. The defamation article should be formulated very clearly referring to Article 19(3) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and given the opportunity to defend the truth/verification (GC 34). UN General Comment No. 34 recommends the abolition of defamation, if it is not possible, defamation is only allowed for the most serious cases with non-imprisonment threats. This has an impact on a very wide spectrum of actions or expressions that can be charged with the provisions of this article which then results in confusion in its implementation.

15. In its application, Article 27 paragraph 3 of the ITE Law is often used as the basis for reporting journalists, anti-corruption activists, human rights defenders, environmental activists, academicians. Not only on content distributed by individuals, journalism products are also reported with this article. Based on SAFEnet digital rights situation report in 2018-2021, there are more than 30 cases of online defamation targeted toward journalists, activists, human rights defenders, academicians. In practice, there is an expansion of the interpretation of Article 27 paragraph (3) which is often used to ensnare insults directed at companies and state institutions. With the existence of this article, it has the potential to ensnare legitimate expressions issued in
the public interest because they do not recognize exceptions and limit the right to expression and opinion.

Hate Speech Articles

16. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) adopted by the United Nations in December 1965 is an international human rights instrument that becomes a reference for preventing hate speech, which is specifically based on hatred of race, ethnicity, skin color, or national origin.

17. In Indonesia there are several regulations for hate speech, namely 156 and Article 157(1) of the Criminal Code (KUHP), Article 6 of Law No. 9 of 1998 concerning Freedom to Express Opinions in Public and Article 28 (paragraph 2) of the ITE Law.

18. Based on SAFEnet digital rights situation report in 2018-2021, there are more than 26 cases of Article 28 paragraph 2 of the ITE Law, including case Diananta Putra Samedi, a journalist at Balikpapan, sentenced to 6 months jail for hate speech, although his investigation report based on facts on land grabbing of indigenous people by a palm factory company.

Blasphemy Articles

19. Article 156a of the Criminal Code (known as the 1965 Blasphemy Law) in its application can be weaponized to prosecute religious minorities. The pending draft amendments to the Criminal Code expand the 1965 Blasphemy Law to add six broad provisions of religion-related speech.

20. Furthermore, the law poses threats to online expression due to the criminalization of broad categories, including insulting public authorities and institutions; writing, promoting, or broadcasting information about contraceptives or abortion; spreading or associating with communism; distributing false or inaccurate information; and defamation.

Fake News Articles

21. Although Indonesia did not have a specific law to regulate fake news, Indonesia uses three laws to criminalize fake news perpetrators. First, Article 14 and Article 15 of Law Number 1 of 1946 concerning the Criminal Law Regulations with a maximum prison sentence of two years. Law No. 1 of 1946 is an affirmation of the enactment of the criminal law that was drafted since the Dutch colonial era. However, the use of the 1946 Law is considered inappropriate because this regulation was passed when Indonesia was newly independent and of course long before the internet era. In addition, the 1946 Act was used to regulate a high level of chaos. The uproar
among netizens on social media is considered not enough to categorize it as 'chaos' and use it as the basis for determining the suspect. Second, Article 390 of the Criminal Code which regulates a similar issue but with a slightly different formulation, by using the phrase “publishing fake news”. The maximum sentence given under this article is 2 years and 8 months. And third, Article 28 paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 45 paragraph 1 of the ITE Law which reads: "Any person intentionally, and without rights spreads false and misleading news which causes consumer losses in Electronic Transactions." Violation of this article is subject to imprisonment for 6 years and or a fine of Rp 1 billion.

22. The ITE Law has become an anti-fake news law similar to that enforced in the Southeast Asian region. The punishment of fake news or hoaxes in the digital era is something new for the police and the legal system landscape in Indonesia. In its application, the results of the SAFEnet study in 2020 showed the inconsistent application of the articles used and instead became a practice of silencing expressions. The article 28 paragraph 1 is problematic because it does not provide a clear formulation of what "fake and misleading news" is. This article actually regulates fake news that causes consumer losses in electronic transactions.

23. In the Indonesian context, the regulation of hoaxes in the 1946 Law and the ITE Law is very limited to emphasize the protection of freedom of expression in accordance with the human rights legal framework. In the two laws, strict restrictions are not carried out and open space for interpretation. So that in practice, it gives to ambiguity or arbitrary interpretation and is often misused. The capacity of law enforcement to understand and interpret human rights law standards is also not sufficient, so that efforts to enforce laws related to hoaxes are very biased in interest.

24. In a number of cases, hoaxes or fake news are actually used to silence freedom of expression. Citizens or activists who upload critical content are vulnerable to criminalization because they are accused of spreading hoaxes or fake news.

**Treason Articles**

25. The treason articles (derived from the word Aanslag) are derived from Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlandsch Indie (WvSNI) which was first enacted with Koninklijk Besluit (Order of the King) Number 33 dated October 15, 1915 and came into force on January 1, 1918. WvSNI is a derivative from WvS (Wetboek van Strafrecht) in the Netherlands which was created in 1881 and enforced in the Netherlands in 1886. The colonial government at that time applied the principle of concordance (adjustment) for the implementation of WvS in its colonies.

26. The main problem is that the Criminal Code does not provide a definition or understanding of the word "Aanslag". Another problem is that there is no official Indonesian translation of the
Indonesian Criminal Code. Finally, "Aanslag" which is an important phrase in the articles of the Criminal Code is widely translated into Indonesian as the word "Makar". Thus, the treason phrase is then translated according to the preferences of each translator. The Aanslag articles originating from Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlandsch Indie (WvSNI) have not been changed even once by the Government of Indonesia after their enactment.

27. Treason articles could be found in Article 106 of the Criminal Code and article 110 of the Criminal Code.

28. Until this report was made, the amendment to the article on treason in the Criminal Code has not occurred, as is also not evident in the new Criminal Code Bill which is currently being discussed by the government and the legislature.”

29. Number of treason cases: Throughout 2019, 85 Papuans and 1 non-Papuan named Jakub Fabian Skrzypski were prosecuted with Article 106 and Article 110 of the Criminal Code. Meanwhile, Tempo media reported that during 2019-2020 there were 120 Papuan activists and civilians who were imprisoned on charges of treason. In 2021, apart from Victor Yeimo who was arrested in May 2021, Frans Wasini was arrested and prosecuted in December 2021.

Cut Internet Access Article

30. The Amendment Law of UU ITE in 2016 gives the Government a right to terminate access and/or order Electronic System Operators to terminate access to Electronic Information and/or Documents with content that violates the law. There is a current Negative Content Regulation issued by the Minister of Communications and Informatics, which authorizes the MOCI to block internet websites with negative content based on reports from the public, Government institutions or law enforcement authorities. The Amendment Law has included a similar right (although without the need for reports to be made to the MOCI) and now the Negative Content Regulation has a firmer legal basis on which the MOCI can act.

31. The Amendment Law provides that there will be a Government Regulation implementing these provisions, however in the absence of the implementing regulation, it is likely the MOCI will continue to use the Negative Content Regulation issued by the Minister of Communications and Informatics.

32. Article 40 paragraph 2b says: “In carrying out the prevention as referred to in paragraph (2a), the government has the authority to cut off access and/or order the electronic system operator to cut off access to electronic information and/or electronic documents that have content that violates the law.”
33. In August 2019, the Jokowi administration showed securitization approaches to handle the situation in Papua, especially responding to the racial discrimination case targeting several Papuan students who lived in Surabaya and Malang dormitories. During that time, not only repressive measures from the security apparatus, but Jokowi administration decided to “kill the switch” This is also recorded in history as the first internet shutdown by the Indonesian government. (Anthony Lee, 2020) During the period, the government shut down the internet in Papua for 338 hours, start with slow down the internet on 19-21 August 2019, followed by the internet shutdown on 22 August to 4 September 2019 under the pretext of preventing the spread of false information in Papua and West Papua.

34. In 2020, there were 4 reports allegedly bandwidth throttling (partial shutdowns) being imposed again in Papua and West Papua provinces and in 2021, another 12 internet outages, where 8 of them allegedly internet shutdown related to Indonesia military operations.

**Contempt of Court Article**

35. In the new Criminal Code Bill, specifically Article 281, the Indonesia Government tries to revive criminal acts against the judicial process (contempt of court) punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of 1 year or a fine of a maximum of 10 million rupiah.

36. The existence of a contempt of court article in the Criminal Code Bill also has the potential to threaten the independence of the journalist profession who tries to report on cases that are going on in court. The essence of the article contains a prohibition on publishing or allowing to publish any information regarding the judicial administration process that may interfere with the independence of the court in deciding cases.

**Recommendations**

1. Ensure that existing legal and constitutional provisions protecting human rights in particular freedom of expression, association and assembly are fully implemented nationwide;
2. Repeal or amend problematic articles of ITE Law so that there is no more abuse of the law to punish those people who express criticism and dissenting opinions;
3. Repeal or amend articles 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code to avoid restrictions on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;
4. End prosecutions under articles 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code for exercising freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;
5. Revise article 40 of ITE Law to end efforts to limit and terminate access that violate the law and are not proportional and based on court decisions;
6. Repeal Article 281 in the new Criminal Code Bill that threatens the independence of the journalist profession who tries to report on cases that are going on in court.
A culture of violence that threatens freedom of expression during pandemic

35. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the freedom of expression in Indonesia was not yet progressing; otherwise, it was getting worse. Despite the urge to handle pandemics properly, the government ignored it and tried to silence the critics. The culture of violence was perpetuated through irresponsible policies that violated human rights.

36. The police, particularly General Idham Azis as the Chief of National Police, signed a few telegrams, which were claimed to guide the police to carry out their duty during the pandemic. In reality, one telegram numbered ST 1100/iv/huk.7.1/2020 issued in April 2021 instructed all the police to cyber-patrol and enforce the law against people criticizing the president, public officials, and state institutions. When the police issued this telegram, we found an escalation of attacks on freedom of expression in the form of arresting people who allegedly spread hoaxes one month before and one month after the issuance of the telegram. Overall, we saw this telegram letter to intimidate the people who want to criticize the state, which leads to the silencing of public expression.

37. In April 2020, the government issued a directive to police to combat alleged disinformation about the Covid-19 pandemic and criticism of the government, resulting in arresting 51 individuals under this policy by June. The chief of the National Police in October 2020 issued instructions for online surveillance of activists and engagement in pro-government counter-narratives. Along with many protests against a controversial omnibus law, this policy added to the list of hundreds of protesters arrested in 18 different provinces.

38. Even further, albeit the worsening situation of the Covid-19 pandemic, the government did not stop shrinking the civil space. On February 19, 2021, the National Police Chief signed a circular letter establishing a unit to prevent cybercrime. This unit was called the virtual police unit and was established with a circular letter numbered SE/2/11/2021 concerning Awareness of Ethical Culture to Create Clean, Healthy, and Productive Indonesian Digital Space. In the operations, the National Police claimed to prioritize restorative justice, which means that prosecution is the last step in dealing with violations of the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law. However, the actual formation of this virtual police is contradictory with President Joko Widodo's statement, which highlighted the opportunity for the ITE Law to be revised because virtual police existed as a response to the widespread use of offenses in the ITE Law. The implementation of virtual police only aimed to remove any critical contents that have been published in social media without providing knowledge regarding infringed content because the police do not convey in detail the criteria for content deemed to have violated the ITE Law.
39. The virtual police establishment was also problematic in terms of its regulation. The circular letter only regulated its establishment, while the procedures for the virtual police's duty in monitoring and issuing a warning has no clear basis law. The content of the warning issued by the virtual police was written like a court verdict. Individuals who were reprimanded are considered to have fulfilled the elements of the article in ITE Law and have the potential to violate the mentioned law. Moreover, the verification of the content should have been carried out by the appointed expert, and this process was mainly ignored by the virtual police, who determined the element of offense solely based on a subjective process without any evidence.

40. Since its first establishment, at least 476 accounts have received a warning for allegedly containing hate speech content. However, the measure of hate speech has never been precise. The increase in numbers showed that the implementation of the virtual police had become a new tool of repression in the digital world, as they threatened the public's freedom of expression on social media. Based on KontraS's monitoring, the virtual police's warnings tend to target those actively criticizing the government.

Recommendations

a. Recognize the rights of citizens to express themselves, express differences of opinion, both online and offline, and provide protection based on the protection of human rights;
b. Halt the operations of cyber police or any kind of unit that monitors the freedom of expression in digital space;

The threat of doxxing (in digital space) in suppressing freedom of expression

41. The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) said that in the 2020-2021 period, the most cases of violations of freedom of expression occurred in the digital space. In five recent years, digital attacks against human rights defenders in Indonesia have tended to increase. Based on SAFEnet monitoring, for instance, at least 193 incidents of digital attacks took place in 2021. This is an increase of 38% compared to the previous year in 2020 (147 incidents). The highest number of attacks in 2021 was related to the national political situation throughout the year, particularly in the context of the National Civics Test undertaken by KPK staff.

42. From the backgrounds of the victims, it becomes clear that digital attacks in Indonesia are increasingly political in nature. This can be seen through the high rate of attacks against critical groups, such as activists, journalists/media, students, and civil society organizations. Attacks against these four groups represented 58.95% of all digital attacks in 2021.

43. In general, hacking was the most common method of digital attack, with 136 incidents (70.46%) in 2021. This was followed by doxing with 24 incidents (12.43%), data breaches and other attacks with 14 incidents each (7.25%), impersonation with nine incidents (4.66%), and phishing with six incidents (3.11%).
44. From the 47 various doxing cases from 2017 until 2021, it can be seen that doxing can happen to all internet users. However, journalists and activists have a higher vulnerability compared to others. This shows that doxing has been used by certain parties to terrorize those who were targeted by attacks.

45. Even though doxing is done online, it has caused real and serious harm to victims by transferring bullying from the Internet to the physical world. In the doxing cases that have occurred, apart from facing online trolling, it turns out that many people get physical terror, starting from their homes being visited by unknown people, surrounded and persecuted, receiving death threats. It is not rare that the latter is to be directed at the victim’s family, parents and spouses.

46. In addition, because they feel they have received direct threats via Direct Message, mentions, instant messages, or telephone calls from unknown numbers, victims of doxing experience psychological trauma, become paranoid in their surroundings, shut themselves off and even in certain cases have to move locations, whether to stay overnight at a relative’s house or into a safe house for a while.

47. Another risk that victims of doxing face are the legal risks of being taken to the police station and criminalized. Most of these victims were subject to the articles of blasphemy or the articles of hate speech when the group carrying out the pick-up at the victim’s house was not satisfied with the apologies that the doxing victim gave.

48. Another issue that should be highlighted regarding the right to feel safe online is data breach and online gender based violence. The Indonesian government fails to protect the personal data of its citizens after data breaching involving prominent government websites such as National Insurance Body (JKN), e-HAC, and Indonesian Police website.

**Recommendations**

a. President of Republic of Indonesia to urge all the ministers to respect the critics from the public and not to use any repressive approach;

b. The National Police to conduct law enforcement of doxing perpetrators, hence it will not repeat in the future.

**Minor and students’ right to freedom of expression**

49. In regards to freedom of expression for children and students, it cannot be separated from the silencing acts from the government and the agents towards thoughts voiced out by the mentioned group. The act can be seen through several cases such as the arbitrary mass arrests during demonstration, threats of drop out, online attacks, etc.
50. In June 2020 to May 2021, there have been 3 cases of mass arbitrary arrest. Several areas that were engaging with demonstration activities in those times were in Jakarta, Semarang, and Central Java and have arrested 95 protesters. The biggest number was in October 2020, where the Indonesian Omnibus Law invited protests through demonstration acts. Several of the protesters include students and they were caught without the legal process. It doesn’t stop there, in Jakarta, 8th October 2020, security officers use force such as using tear gas to push back the protest crowd.\textsuperscript{xiv}

51. Next is the case of Indonesia’s International Labor Action and the National Education Day on 1st - 3rd May 2021. In this range of time, dozens of students were caught and brought to the police cars. Rationalizations done by the police for this act are to prevent riot and students should not be allowed to be in charge of this act.\textsuperscript{xv}

52. Cases mentioned above are baseless in regards to the police statement of ‘prevention act’ since tracing back to the International Human Rights Standardization, such arrests which do not follow the procedures are categorized as enforced disappearances. This is highlighted in the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.\textsuperscript{xvi}

53. Recalling to the Omnibus Law incident, students are also threatened to be dropped out by the MoU given from the security officer to the designated university (rectorate). The MoU was signed by both parties so that students are not allowed to participate in demonstrations. If so, the student will receive a Police Record Certificate (SKCK) and send it to the rectorate for them to take action.\textsuperscript{xvii}

\textbf{Recommendations}

a. The Indonesian Government shall ensure the rights for students and children to express their voices by ensuring the existing legal and constitutional provisions protecting human rights in particular freedom of expression, association and assembly are fully implemented nationwide.

b. The Indonesian Government along with the agents to abolish individual and mass arbitrary arrest when there are protest acts

\textsuperscript{i} Human Rights Council, \textit{Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Indonesia}, 14 July 2017, Document A/HRC/36/7 - Para. 139 recommendations No. 139.51 (Germany)


x SAFEnet, “Laporan Situasi Hak Digital Indonesia Tahun 2021”, 2022

xi SAFEnet, “Laporan Situasi Hak Digital Indonesia Tahun 2021”, 2022, last modified


xv Ibid

xvi Ibid